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 Introduction 
For a long time the freedom of association was thought not to have a negative 
dimension. No international protection of the right not to associate existed1. The 
negative freedom of association was not inserted in the ILO-conventions no.  87 and 98, 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the European Declaration on Human Rights 
and the original European Social Charter of 1961. In article 20.2 the UDHR stipulates 
that “no one may be compelled to belong to an organisation”, but the more specific 
article 23.4 only recognises “the right to form and joint trade unions for the protection of 
his interests”. An amendment to introduce the right not to associate into the ILO-
convention no. 87, was rejected by the preparatory International Labour Conference2.  
 
The silence of the conventions was interpreted differently by ILO- and European 
monitoring bodies. The monitoring bodies of the ILO concluded that the admissibility of 
union security clauses was left to the discretion of the states, as long as they were the 
result of free negotiations between workers‟ and employers‟ organisations and not 
imposed by law3. The ECourtHR recognised a negative freedom of association, despite 
the fact that the preparatory works explicitly mention that it was “undesirable” to 
introduce the negative freedom of association into the Convention “on account to the 
difficulties raised by the „closed shop system‟ in certain countries”4. Ironically, it was the 
closed shop that provoked the Court‟s jurisprudence about the negative freedom of 
association. 
 
1. The birth of the right not to associate: the closed shop 
In 1981 the Court had to decide on a closed shop agreement for the first time. In the 
judgment of 13 August 1981, Young, James and Webster v. UK, referred by three 
workers who were fired because they refused to become member of a trade union which 
signed a closed shop agreement with their employer after their engagement, the 
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ECourtHR accepted that article 11 of the Convention implied some measure of negative 
freedom of association. Although a general rule protecting the negative freedom was 
deliberately omitted from article 11 of the Convention, the Court considered that “it does 
not follow [from such an omission]  that the negative aspect of a person‟s freedom of 
association falls completely outside the ambit of Article 11”.  
 
In the absence of any defence by the Thatcher government, the Court held that there 
had been a violation. The Court attached great value to the consequences of the closed 
shop – loss of employment and livelihood – and the political objections of the workers 
against trade union membership5. However, the judgment reveals the existence of major 
differences between the judges of the Court, as the three Scandinavian judges wrote a 
common dissenting opinion. Due to those differences, the Court didn‟t reject the 
assumption that “Article 11 does not guarantee the negative aspect of that freedom on 
the same footing as the positive aspect”, leaving the option open that other forms of 
compulsion to join a particular trade union could be in line with the Convention.  
 
As only a form of such compulsion which, in the circumstances of the case, strikes at the 
very substance of the freedom of association guaranteed by Article 11 constituted an 
interference, in the 20 April 1993 judgment, Sibson v. UK, the application of a dismissed 
worker was denied because he didn‟t oppose to trade union membership on account of 
specific convictions and would have suffered no damage if he agreed with a transfer to a 
nearby depot6. 
 
2. The extension of the negative freedom of association 
 
A. Professional organisations 
 
In a judgment of 30 June 1993, Sigurdur A. Sigurjonsson v. Iceland, the Court had to 
decide on the obligation to be member of a professional organisation to attain a taxicab 
licence. Unlike in the previous cases, in this case the organisation was no trade union, 
but a professional organisation of self-employed, and the mandatory membership was 
not the result of a collective agreement, but imposed by law.  
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Faced with the Icelandic defence that the negative freedom of association has to be 
interpreted restrictively on account of the preparatory works, the Court noted that “it did 
not attach decisive importance to them; rather it used them as a working hypothesis”. 
The Court also recalled that “the Convention is a living instrument which must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions” and surpassed its previous Young, 
James and Webster jurisprudence. It now stated that “Article 11 must be viewed as 
encompassing a negative right of association”. Nevertheless, the Court refused to 
determine whether this negative right is to be considered on an equal footing with the 
positive right, arguing that it is not necessary to do so.  
No significant weight was attached to the fact that, before being granted the licence, the 
applicant agreed to become a member. However, the Court did not yet disapproved pre-
entry closed shops, i.e. the obligation to join a trade union at the time of taking up a 
contract of employment as opposed to the situation of a post-entry closed shop in which 
a similar obligation is imposed after recruitment. Because the rule that imposed the pre-
entry closed shop lacked statutory basis, the applicant found himself in a post-entry 
closed shop situation. The Court relied again on the loss of livelihood of the applicant 
and his ideological objections7. 
B. Collective agreements 
In 1996 the ECourtHR had to decide on an alleged violation of an employer‟s negative 
freedom of association, when the owner of a restaurant complained about a lack of State 
protection against the industrial action taken against his restaurant8. The collective 
action aimed at inducing the owner to meet the trade union‟s demand that he be bound 
by a collective agreement: either by joining an employers‟ organisation or by signing a 
substitute agreement, a common practice in Sweden where no system of universally 
binding collective agreements exists.  
The Commission agreed with the applicant, but the Court did not. In the judgment of 25 
April 1996, Gustafsson v. Sweden, the Court accepted that “to a degree” the enjoyment 
of the applicant‟s freedom of association might be affected by the pressure to join an 
employers‟ organisation or to sign a substitute agreement. However, only the first 
alternative involved membership of an association and the applicant was not compelled 
to opt for membership of an employers‟ organization because of the economic 
disadvantages attached to the substitute agreement. In reality, the applicant‟s principal 
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objection to the signing of a collective agreement appeared to be his disagreement with 
the collective-bargaining system in Sweden.  
While the Court considered that article 11 of the Convention did not guarantee a right 
not to enter into a collective agreement, it wouldn‟t go so far as to completely exclude 
collective agreements from the scope of article 11. It stated that article 11 may well 
extend to treatment connected with the operation of a collective-bargaining system, but 
only where such treatment impinges on freedom of association. Compulsion which does 
not significantly affect the enjoyment of that freedom, even if it causes economic 
damage, cannot give rise to any positive obligation under article 11. Having regard to the 
margin of appreciation to be accorded to the State in the area under consideration, the 
Court did not find that Sweden failed to secure the applicant‟s rights under article 11 9 10.  
In the judgment C499/09 of 9 Mars 2006, Hans Werhof v. Freeway Traffic Systems, the 
negative freedom of association was used by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
to refuse a dynamic interpretation of article 3, § 1, of the Council Directive Transfers of 
Undertakings11. The Court decided that, if the collective agreements concluded after the 
transfer of undertaking would be binding for the transferee, his fundamental right not to 
join an association could be affected. It referred to the Gustafsson v. Sweden judgment, 
but it is questionable whether that interpretation accords to the judgment. 
C. Pre-entry closed shops 
In the 11 January 2006 judgment, Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, the Court 
made an end to the distinction between post-entry and pre-entry closed shops, the latter 
still regarded as lawful in some national legal orders. In the case two workers 
complained about the obligation to become member of a particular trade union set as a 
condition for employment, because they did not share the political opinions of the trade 
union and wanted to join another trade union.  
Even though this was already the fourth case about the negative freedom of association, 
the Court brought in a new argument. The Court stated that the notion of personal 
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autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the Convention 
guarantees and must therefore be seen as an essential corollary of the individual‟s 
freedom of choice implicit in article 11. Without mentioning it, the Court moved forward in 
its recognition of the negative aspect of the freedom of association. It noted that, 
“although it has not taken any definite stand on the question whether the negative 
aspect of the freedom of association should be considered on an equal footing with the 
positive right, it does not in principle exclude that the negative and the positive aspects 
should be afforded the same level of protection in certain situations”. Thirteen years 
earlier, in Sigurdur A. Sigurjonsson, the Court refused to examine this question. 
According to the Court the wide margin of appreciation which states enjoy as how to 
secure the freedom of trade unions to protect the occupational interests of their 
members, must be considered to be reduced where the domestic law of a state permits 
the conclusion of closed-shop agreements between unions and employers which run 
counter to the freedom of choice of the individual inherent in article 11. The Court 
acknowledges that individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a 
group, but chances that group interest may prevail seem small as the Court states that 
“a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities 
and avoids any abuse of a dominant position”. Therefore, the worker who was aware 
that trade union membership was a condition for obtaining and retaining his 
employment, must also be protected by article 11, because individuals applying for 
employment often find themselves in a vulnerable situation and are only too eager to 
comply with the term of employment offered12.  
The Court appears to be influenced by the Committee on Social Rights, the monitoring 
body of the European Social Charter. Invited by a collective complaint of the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, the Committee on Social Rights already 
disapproved pre-entry closed shops in 2002. The Committee stated on that occasion 
that clauses set out in the collective agreements which reserve employment for 
members of a certain union are clearly contrary to the freedom guaranteed by article 5, 
as they restrict workers‟ free choice as to whether or not to join one or other of the 
existing trade unions or to set up separate organisations13. 
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D. Monitoring fees  
In the 13 February 2007 judgment, Evaldsson and others v. Sweden, the Court decided 
that the so called “monitoring fees”, i.e. deductions on the wages as a reimbursement of 
the costs made by the trade union for the monitoring of wages, a common practice in 
Sweden, were in violation with the Convention. However, the decision was not based on 
a negative freedom derived from article 11, but on article 1 of the First Additional 
Protocol to the Convention. The Court disapproved the monitoring fees, because in its 
view the union‟s wage monitoring activities lacked the necessary transparency as the 
unions could not give the information to verify that the fees corresponded to the actual 
cost of the inspection work and that the amounts paid were also not used for other 
purposes14.  
 
The choice for article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the Convention instead of 
article 11 was not a complete surprise. In the same collective complaint the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise also had acted against the “monitoring fees”, on 
the basis of article 5 of the European Social Charter, but without success. The 
Committee on Social Rights considered that the payment of a fee to the trade union for 
financing its activity of wage monitoring cannot be regarded in itself as unjustified. There 
was no interference with the freedom of a worker to join a trade union, since the 
payment of the fee does not automatically lead to membership and in addition is not 
required from workers members of other trade unions. Yet, the Committee expressed 
doubts as to the use of the fees for activities other than wage monitoring, but left it to the 
national courts to decide the matter15.  
 
By contrast, in the 2008 published Digest the view is expressed that “to secure the 
negative freedom of association, domestic law must clearly prohibit all pre-entry or post-
entry closed shop clauses and all union security clauses (automatic deductions from the 
wages of all workers, whether union members or not, to finance the trade union acting 
within the company)”16.  
 
E. Contributions to employers’ organisations 
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In the 27 April 2010 judgment, Olafsson v. Iceland, the Court considered the statutory 
obligation to pay an “industry charge” to an employers‟ organisation as a violation of 
article 11, due to a lack of transparency and accountability towards non-members. 
Although the obligation to which the applicant was subject did not involve formal 
membership, it had an important feature in common with that of joining an association, 
namely that of contributing financially to the funds of the employers‟ organisation. This 
common feature could be seen as being reinforced by the fact that members who paid 
the industry charge were entitled to a reduction of their membership fees by an amount 
equivalent to the charge. It made no difference to the Court that the charge was not paid 
directly to the employers‟ organisation, but indirectly through the State Treasury.  
 
The amounts were relatively modest and the degree of compulsion to which the 
applicant was subjected may be regarded as significantly less serious than in other 
cases, where an applicant‟s refusal to join a union resulted in the loss of his employment 
or professional licence and as a consequence his means of livelihood. However, the 
Court stated that in Sorensen and Rasmussen much less serious consequences of a 
refusal to comply with the requirement to join a union have similarly been found to be 
capable of striking at the very substance of the freedom of choice and personal 
autonomy inherent in the right of freedom of association protected by article 11. In 
reality, this was a new reading of the Sorensen and Rasmussen case by the Court as in 
Sorensen and Rasmussen both workers would have lost their jobs if they refused to be a 
member of a specific trade union, although one of them was just a seasonal worker.  
 
Like in the Sigurdur A. Sigurjonsson case, part of the severity of the Court may be 
explained by the fact that the obligation was imposed by law. Whereas the duty of 
payment in the Evaldsson case had been imposed under a collective labour agreement, 
the obligation in the present case was imposed by statute, which meant for the Court 
that the position adopted in the former case could be applied with even greater force. 
The Court follows the ILO where it objects against mandatory contributions imposed by 
law. However, when a law imposes a contribution on all workers, members and non-
members, for the benefit of a majority trade union, this is in conformity with the ILO-
Conventions17.  
 
3. The importance of the negative freedom in the case law of the ECHR 
Over the years the ECourtHR became the major source of the individual freedom of 
association. It should be noticed that the concept of the negative freedom of association 
used by the Court gradually extended. In the beginning it only covered closed shop 
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agreements, i.e. the mandatory membership of an organisation, in those cases in with 
the political opinions of worker were contrary to the organisation‟s views, and the refusal 
of membership led to severe damage, like loss of livelihood. Nowadays the Court also 
disapproves mandatory financial contributions to an organisation, even when they cause 
less severe damage and the only political opinion of the applicant is his denial to pay a 
membership fee. The 2010 judgment, Olafsson v. Iceland, serves as a model for this 
new approach. Although the case deals with a specific Icelandic problem, the imposition 
by law of public assignments on a private organisation, like the Sigurdur A. Sigurjonsson 
case, it may influence future judgments about trade union practices. 
In the same period also the Court‟s vision on the relation between the positive and 
negative freedom of association changed. While in 1981, in Young, James and Webster 
v. UK, the Court only stated that “it does not follow that the negative aspect of a person‟s 
freedom of association falls completely outside the ambit of Article 11”, in 1993, in 
Sigurdur A. Sigurjonsson v. Iceland, it said that “Article 11 must be viewed as 
encompassing a negative right of association”. In the same judgment the Court refused 
to determine whether this negative right is to be considered on an equal footing with the 
positive right, arguing that it is not necessary to do so, but 13 years later, in Sorensen 
and Rasmussen v. Denmark, it mentioned that “although it has not taken any definite 
stand on the question whether the negative aspect of the freedom of association should 
be considered on an equal footing with the positive right, it does not in principle exclude 
that the negative and the positive aspects should be afforded the same level of 
protection in certain situations”. In practice, the Court does not balance the negative and 
positive freedom. Maybe the Court did balance in the 1996 case, Gustafsson v. Sweden, 
when it decided that compulsion which does not significantly affect the enjoyment of 
negative freedom, even if it causes economic damage, cannot give rise to any positive 
obligation under article 11, but if so, it was only implicit. 
One cannot avoid the impression that the Court‟s protection of the negative freedom is 
of greater importance than its protection of the positive freedom of association. By far 
most of the Court‟s case law before 2002 concerns the negative freedom of association. 
Only recently the Court began to play a role in protecting the positive freedom of 
association with judgments like the 2 July 2002 judgment, Wilson, National Union of 
Journalists and Others v. UK, the 27 February 2007 judgment, Associated Society of 
Locomotive Engineers & Fireman v. UK 18 19, the 12 November 2008 judgment, Demir 
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 In this case the Court states that “As an employee or worker should be free to join, or not to join a trade 
union without being sanctioned or subject to disincentives (with reference to Young, James and Webster 
and Wilson), so should the trade union be equally free to chose its members. Where associations are 
formed by people, who, espousing particular values or ideals, intend to pursue common goals, it would run 
counter to the very effectiveness of the freedom at stake if they had no control over their membership.”  
and Baykara v. Turkey, the 9 December 2008 judgment, Ciocan and others v. Romania 
and the 30 July 2009 judgment, Danilenkov and Others v. Russia. The Court is 
dependent on the cases brought before it and thus cannot be blamed for the trade 
unions‟ past lack of interest. Individuals are more likely to send cases before the 
ECourtHR, while trade unions can use other procedures like collective complaints before 
more specialised bodies like the ILO Freedom of Association Committee or European 
Committee on Social Rights. However, the case law on the negative freedom of 
association demonstrates that the ECourtHR is more focussed on individual rights and 
therefore more advantageous for individuals than for trade unions, as the Court not 
always has a substantial knowledge and understanding of the particularities of collective 
bargaining systems, or refuses to bear those particularities in mind. 
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